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CHILDREN, ARMED CONFLICT, AND GENOCIDE: APPLYING THE 
LAW OF GENOCIDE TO THE RECRUITMENT AND USE OF 
CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT 
Jeffery R. Ray* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper shows that the use of child soldiers in armed conflict has the 
potential to be considered as genocide. A brief background of genocide is 
presented prior to the analysis. Part I of the analysis will discuss three issues: first, 
the modern understanding of genocide and the substantive areas of law that govern 
it; second, the definition of “child” within the international arena as it relates to 
child soldiering; third, a discussion to determine if children can constitute a 
“group” in the context of the law of genocide.  
Part II provides a discussion elaborating on Part I, then analyzes the five 
disjunctive elements of genocide. A general rule will be synthesized for each 
element. General rules are synthesized from judicial decisions interpreting the 
genocide regime, soft law, and scholarly writings. Each element includes an 
analysis to determine applicability of the element as it relates to child soldiers.  
INTRODUCTION 
The use, or recruitment, of child soldiers can potentially be punished under the 
genocide regime following criteria established by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda in deciding the case of Jean Paul Akayesu. Primarily, the case 
analysis concludes that females constitute a group, or at least a subgroup, of such 
import that the genocide regime is applicable,1 and is the anchor to which this 
article is moored. Due to the historically unclear age of majority regarding persons 
in armed conflict, this article provides a substantive analysis dedicated to 
determining the age of majority for purposes of clarity. 
United Nations reports, since 1998, specified that the “changing nature of 
conflict put children at a higher risk than ever before.”2 Previous statistics 
accentuate the magnitude of the preceding statement. Armed conflicts, from 1987 
 ________________________  
 * The author is a practitioner in central Florida. He possesses an LL.M., with commendation honors, 
from the University of Aberdeen. He attained his J.D. in the top third of his class at Florida A&M University, 
College of Law. The author studied human rights law and the law of armed conflict at Florida A&M University 
and the University of Oxford. 
 1. See Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 2. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Report of the Special Rep. of 
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 3, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/65/219 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/65/219. 
1
: Children, Armed Conflict, and Genocide
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2014
336 Barry Law Review Vol. 19, No. 2 
 
to 1997, have had devastating effects on children.3 Specifically, children have been 
killed, maimed, and displaced from their homes in mass numbers: “2 million 
children have been killed; 6 million children have been maimed, injured, or 
permanently disabled; 1 million children have been orphaned or separated from 
their parents.”4 The Special Representative for the Secretary-General for Children 
and Armed Conflict stated in his speech, in 1998, that: 
[There were] [m]ore than 300,000 children under the age of 18 . . . 
fighting in conflicts worldwide; [c]hildren account for one half of 
the worldwide total of 24 million refugees and internally displaced 
peoples; [an astounding] 90 per cent of the casualties in today’s 
conflicts are civilians, including a large and increasing number of 
children and women. By contrast, that number was only 5 per cent 
in the First World War, rising to 48 per cent in the Second World 
War.5 
The ten-year “strategic review” (“Review”) of the Machel Report (1998) 
reveals that the features of armed conflicts have changed as a result of 
technological, political, and other reasons.6 Awareness and international concern 
for children involved in or affected by armed conflict has risen.7 Efforts to reduce 
or eliminate the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict have produced 
some positive results since the Machel Report.8 The Review did not spend a 
significant portion of its analysis on specific figures. Instead, the Review 
recognized that the figures from the complex issues revolving around children in 
armed conflict would yield “inaccurate” results.9  
Relevant figures mentioned in the Review are staggering. Children around the 
globe constitute over thirty-three percent of casualties from land mines and 
unexploded-explosive ordinances.10 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
 ________________________  
 3. Press Release, Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Secretary-
General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Condemns Attacks on Civilians and Use of 
Child Soldiers, U.N. Doc. HR/4388 (Nov. 5, 1998) [hereinafter Press Release, Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict], available at http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/press-release/9Nov98/. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. See Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Report of the Special Rep. 
of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, pt. 2, ¶¶ 9–15, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/62/228 (Aug. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Report for Children and Armed Conflict], available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/62/228. 
 7. See generally id. 
 8. Id. Sri Lanka, Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Israel, and the occupied 
Palestinian territories, and Myanmar have all “committed” to increase their respective recognition of various 
children’s rights. These results are not the maximum desired result from several of these nations. However, 
economic and resource limitations play a role within the decisions of countries involved in or recovering from 
armed conflict, or prolonged poverty. See id. at pt. 1, ¶¶ 31–49. 
 9. Id. at pt. 2, ¶ 16. 
 10. Id. at pt. 2, ¶ 18. 
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children were the victims of over thirty-three percent of acts of sexual violence.11 
There were “18.1 million children . . . among populations living with the effects of 
displacement” surrounding armed conflict.12 
The Review makes an important parallel with the impact of recent armed 
conflicts on children, and those during the period preceding the original Machel 
Report. The parallel is that the “impact on children remains as brutal as ever,” 
with regard to armed conflict.13 The Review acknowledges that armed forces, 
primarily non-state actors, are actively using children in large numbers.14 Their 
roles include being used as “fighters, cooks, porters[,] . . . messengers, and [they 
are also] . . . used for sexual purposes.”15 
Genocide, the ultimate criminal penalty, should be the proper prosecutorial 
method against those who use child soldiers, when available. Children have been 
involved in armed conflict as long as mankind has engaged in it.16 Such can be 
seen in the Israelite destruction of much of Canaan and the Roman decimation of 
Carthage.17 Recent evolution in warfare technology, such as the advent of compact 
assault rifles, has increased the use of children in armed conflict.18 The subsequent 
loss of innocence, deprivation of culture, and the obvious loss of the life of child 
soldiers are all direct reasons to ensure the highest degree of penalty available 
against those who use child soldiers.  
This paper seeks to prove that the use of child soldiers in armed conflict has the 
potential to be considered as genocide. Genocide, since World War II, has 
generally been considered as an offense committed with a special intent or dolus 
specialis.19 This special “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group” that meets any of the five requisite categories of harm 
under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(“Genocide Convention”), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute”), or International Criminal Court jurisprudence.20 This factor is 
 ________________________  
 11. Id. at pt. 2, ¶ 21 (citing U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and 
Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶ 40, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2007/391 (June 28, 2007)). 
 12. Report for Children and Armed Conflict, supra note 6, at pt. 2, ¶ 25. 
 13. Id. at pt. 2, ¶ 16 (emphasis added). 
 14. See id. at pt. 2, ¶ 19. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See UNICEF, STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 1996, at 13 (1996), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc/archive/ENGLISH/The%20State%20of%20the%20World%27s%20Children%20199
6.pdf; MATTHEW HAPPOLD, CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Manchester University Press 2005). 
 17. See ERIC D. WEITZ, A CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: UTOPIAS OF RACE AND NATION 8 (Princeton 
University Press 2003). The author gives an interesting assertion of modern genocide becoming more “calculated” 
and “systematic” in the twentieth century. The correlation with this “systematic” termination of populations would 
be an interesting lens to look at the recent, extensive, use of children in the same time frame. There may indeed be 
a method of “preemptively destroying” a future opposition by using their children in support of one’s militaristic 
goals. Indoctrination of the children before they have the “tools” necessary may even provide a substantial 
argument for the phenomena. See generally id. 
 18. See HAPPOLD, supra note 16, 4–5. 
 19. See Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 498, 517 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 20. See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, opened 
for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter The Genocide Convention], available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/044/31/IMG/NR004431.pdf?OpenElement; Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 6, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
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case specific and is not necessary, for purposes of determining the plausibility of 
this thesis, for a full analysis.  
A brief background of genocide is presented prior to the analysis in Parts I and 
II. Part I will discuss three issues: first, the modern understanding of genocide and 
the substantive areas of law that govern it; second, the definition of “child” within 
the international arena as it relates to child soldiering; third, a discussion to 
determine if children can constitute a “group” in the context of the law of genocide.  
Although the tactic of genocide is of ancient design, this article primarily 
addresses the modern concept as it is covered in international law. The Genocide 
Convention and the Rome Statute are the primary sources for the law of genocide 
as presented in this analysis. Judicial interpretations of the Genocide Convention 
and the Rome Statute are key advancements that are relied upon for this analysis.  
The legal age of majority has been an issue when discussing child soldiering.21 
Consensus on the age of fifteen has appeared to crystallize as the age of majority 
through the supermajority of signatories on the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.22 This crystallization, if in fact the age did crystallize, was quickly put into 
dispute.23 Ultimately, this analysis will acknowledge the normative shifts on the 
age of majority and prescribe an age commensurate with the progressive shift in 
the normative age. The more progressive argument is that Protocol I24 coupled with 
state practice or declarations by states has established eighteen, or at a minimum 
seventeen, as the age of majority for recruitment or use in active combat.25 
Understanding issues regarding and establishing a normative age for a person to be 
recruited or serve in active combat provides clarity for the remainder of the 
analysis. However, it should be noted this is a subsidiary matter of this paper. 
Part II provides a discussion elaborating on Part I then analyzing the five 
disjunctive elements of genocide. A general rule will be synthesized for each 
element. These general rules are synthesized from judicial interpretations of the 
Genocide Convention and its subsequent adaptation, the Rome Statute or variations 
thereof, by International Criminal Tribunals. Each element includes an analysis to 
determine applicability of the element as it relates to child soldiers.  
  
The Rome Statute], available at http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf; see also Akayesu, Case 
No. ICTR-96-4-T. 
 21. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 
[hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child], available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/44/25 (allowing each State’s law to determine the 
age of majority for purposes of defining a child under the convention). 
 22. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME II: PRACTICE, PARTS 1 & 2, at 3109–27 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise 
Doswald-Beck eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-ii-icrc-
eng.pdf (outlining the law and practice of various nations in regards to the recruitment of child soldiers).  
 23. See generally CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 22. For example, upon 
ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Netherlands, Spain, and Uruguay all expressed 
disagreement with the Convention permitting the recruitment of children at the age of 15. See id. at 3110. 
 24. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, opened for signature Feb. 12, 2002, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Protocol I], available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/A_Res_54_263-E.pdf. 
 25. See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 22, at 3109–27; see also Protocol 
I, supra note 24, at art. 1. 
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The initial discussion of Part II is required to determine whether the subsequent 
elements of genocide can be applicable to children as a group. In this part, 
“[genocidal] intent to destroy, in whole or in part, . . . [members of the] group” is 
analyzed in context with the intent of the Genocide Convention, Rome Statute, and 
other international responsibilities.26  
The five elements are analyzed to indicate the strength, or weakness, of each 
element as applied to the law of genocide. First, “[k]illing members of the group” 
is analyzed to determine applicability to children as a group.27 Second, “[c]ausing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” is analyzed while taking 
attributes of children into account.28 Third, “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part” provides opportunity to analyze basic health needs to intentional harm 
inflicted upon child soldiers.29 Fourth, “[i]mposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group” is an aspect that is confidently applied to girl soldiers. 
Young boy soldiers must also be analyzed for a more complete discussion. Fifth, 
“[f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group” is a prominent issue 
within the use of children, as well as within the Genocide Convention, that requires 
discussion.30 
The Genocide Convention of 1948 was in response to the atrocities committed 
against Jewish and other minority groups during World War II.31 German national 
trials which prosecuted Nazi soldiers that killed, or were accomplices to killing, 
over 300,000 people under the crime of murder were superfluous:32 convicting one 
of murdering 300,000 persons is of little difference, regarding sentencing, than of 
one who murders thirty persons.33 Criminal proceedings were limited to murder 
charges under German law once the statute of limitations ran out on all but the 
charge of murder.34 The social harm to humanity of the Nazi atrocities required a 
definition that could adequately describe the harm inflicted during World War II. 
Raphael Lemkin was a prominent figure in carving out the definition of genocide 
for the international community.35 This newly chargeable offense, genocide, 
alleviated the superfluous charges resulting from mass killings under certain 
circumstances. 
 ________________________  
 26. See The Genocide Convention, supra note 20; see also The Rome Statute, supra note 20. 
 27. See infra Part II.B. See also The Genocide Convention, supra note 20. 
 28. See infra Part II.C. See also The Genocide Convention, supra note 20. 
 29. See infra Part II.D. See also The Genocide Convention, supra note 20. 
 30. See infra Part II.F. See also The Genocide Convention, supra note 20. 
 31. See TASK FORCE FOR INT’L COOPERATION ON HOLOCAUST EDUC., REMEMBRANCE AND RESEARCH, 
2010 EDUCATION WORKING GROUP PAPER ON THE HOLOCAUST AND OTHER GENOCIDES 11 (2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/EWG_Holocaust_and_Other_Genocides.pdf. 
 32. See generally NATHAN STOLTZFUS & HENRY FRIEDLANDER, NAZI CRIMES AND THE LAW 28–33 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) (outlining the issues with prosecuting and sentencing Nazi soldiers in 
Germany in the 1960s and 1970s). 
 33. See id. at 28–29. 
 34. Id. at 28. 
 35. See TASK FORCE FOR INT’L COOPERATION ON HOLOCAUST EDUC., REMEMBRANCE AND RESEARCH, 
supra note 31; see also WEITZ, supra note 17, at 8–9. 
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International law has expanded upon the original Genocide Convention due to 
it being tailored to the events of the Shoah.36 The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court was one expansion of the Geneva Convention.37 The Preamble of 
the Rome Statute elucidated, “during [the past] century millions of children, 
women, and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock 
the conscience of humanity.”38 An International Criminal Tribunal has produced 
jurisprudence that interprets the concept of genocide.39  
Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has 
established that genocide can be applied more broadly than previously 
contemplated—specifically relating to acceptable groups under genocide statutes.40 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda clearly articulated that women, as 
a subgroup of Tutsi, were to be recognized as a group under genocide on the basis 
of the intent of the drafters of the Genocide Convention “which, according to the 
travaux préparatoires, was clearly to protect any stable and permanent group.”41 
This interpretation serves as the springboard for this paper by providing a legal 
framework to analogize children to women as articulated in Akayesu. The 
circumstances may differ, regarding types of atrocities, but the underlying analysis 
provides a solid framework for applying genocide to using or recruiting children 
for use in armed conflict. 
“Genocide” is a term derived by international jurist Raphael Lemkin.42 Lemkin 
spent a great deal of effort to articulate the type of extermination, which the Nazi 
Regime committed against the Jewish people, and others, during the Shoah.43 The 
term “genocide” quickly received support toward codification, as shown by the 
enactment of the statutes under the Genocide Convention within four years 
following the close of World War II.44 The 1948 Genocide Convention has been 
interpreted by codification and jurisprudence since its original establishment in 
1948.45 
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) codified the definition regarding 
genocide to be the applicable template that has been adopted by other tribunals.46 
Initially, the Rome Statute was the result of an initiative to establish an ICC to 
apply the law as collectively established to the most serious crimes recognized by 
the international community.47 Ad hoc tribunals, specifically the International 
 ________________________  
 36. This article addresses what is commonly known as the “Holocaust,” instead of the “Shoah” due to any 
issues regarding cultural sensitivity. 
 37. See The Rome Statute, supra note 20, at art. 8. 
 38. See The Rome Statute, supra note 20, at pmbl (emphasis added). 
 39. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 40. Id. at ¶ 701. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See WEITZ, supra note 17, at 8. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. at 8–9. 
 45. See generally id. (Weitz’s book discusses the implications of genocide across multiple historical 
precedents). 
 46. See generally Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 22, 30 (1999). 
 47. See id. at 29–30. 
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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, have interpreted the Rome Statute to include groups 
and forms of acts not previously understood to fall within the purview of the Rome 
Statute.48 The various tribunals adopted versions of the Rome Statute and expanded 
according to the surrounding circumstances. “Genocide” has been interpreted by ad 
hoc tribunals such as: the ICC; the East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes; 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia; the Supreme Iraqi 
Criminal Tribunal (“SICT”); the Special Court for Sierra Leone; the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia. 49 
An interpretation by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has 
established mass rape, of women as a form of genocide.50 This interpretation is an 
expansion on the ideology or conceptualization of what constitutes a group within 
the meaning of genocide. Further, this opens the door to the consideration that 
children are harmed as much—if not more—through armed conflict. This paper 
asserts that this group, children, deserve to be recognized as a group or at least a 




A.   Genocide 
The Genocide Convention etched into international law the modern foundation 
of the crime of genocide.51 Treaties and customary international law are the sources 
of international law that govern genocide.52 There are currently 144 contracting 
parties to the Genocide Convention.53 The Convention entered into force on 
January 12, 1951.54 The nearly sixty-year-old convention has shown how the 
overwhelming majority of the world has formed the basis for this customary 
international law to be binding upon those that have not become a party to the 
 ________________________  
 48. The purview of the Rome Statute is limited to offenses such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes, as defined. The International Tribunal for Rwanda adds violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II, as defined. See The International Criminal Court and Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-CICC-AdHocTribunals_current.pdf (last updated Sept. 9, 2005). 
 49. See GIDEON BOAS, JAMES L. BISCHOFF, & NATALIE L. REID, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
PRACTITIONER LIBRARY, at 136–140. Also noted is the SICT is also known as the Iraqi High Command (IHC), 
and discussed within International Criminal Law Practitioner are the difficulties of translating the Tribunal names 
into English. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 51. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 286, 288–90 (1999). 
 52. Id. at 290–91. 
 53. Chapter IV Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2014). 
 54. Id. 
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Convention. Genocide is now considered to be jus cogens.55 The Genocide 
Convention defines the required elements, mens rea and actus reus, in order to 
qualify as genocide.56 
The Genocide Convention was written to codify principles of law to punish 
and deter the act of genocide after World War II.57 The convention was broad 
enough to expressly cover the societal needs of the post World War II era. Thus, 
the Genocide Convention is the modern origin of the law of genocide as it relates 
to modern rule of law. Similar to most laws, the convention has endured due to its 
ability to be interpreted, through a loose form of stare decisis and sovereign 
interpretation, to meet the slowly changing needs of humanity.58  
The Convention was utilized in the formulation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.59 The Rome Statute defined the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.60 Subject matter jurisdiction of the 
ICC specifically includes, and has produced jurisprudence regarding genocide. 
Genocide law can also be traced to the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremburg under crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg Charter was 
essentially a furtherance of the Treaty of London, which was signed by the Allied 
 ________________________  
 55. See van der Vyver, supra note 51, at 287. 
 56. The Genocide Convention, supra note 20. The Genocide Convention states, in relevant portion:  
ARTICLE II; In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: (a) [k]illing members of the group; (b) [c]ausing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; (c) [d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) [i]mposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) [f]orcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group. 
ARTICLE III; The following acts shall be punishable: (a) [g]enocide; (b) [c]onspiracy to 
commit genocide; (c) [d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) [a]ttempt to 
commit genocide; (e) [c]omplicity in genocide.  
Id. 
 57. See van der Vyver, supra note 51, at 286–87. 
 58. See generally id. (van der Vyver states that “[recent genocide] cases are authority for the proposition 
that the definition and scope of the crime of genocide as a proscription of customary international law have 
developed well beyond the confines dictated by the wording of the Genocide Convention itself.”). 
 59. See generally id. (describing the evolution from the Genocide Convention to the modern International 
Criminal Court). 
 60. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A/Conf.183/9, 17 July 1998, (last 
corrected on January 16, 2002), available at http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf.  
“[G]enocide” means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) [k]illing members of the 
group; (b) [c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) 
[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) [i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; (e) [f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Id. 
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Powers in August of 1945.61 Genocide is impliedly found in the “persecution” 
section of crimes against humanity as written in the Nuremberg Charter.62  
B.   Eighteen Years of Age Is the Progressively Emerging Age of Majority 
to Be Recruited or Utilized as a Soldier Under International Treaty and 
Customary Law of Armed Conflict 
Under customary international law, there is a progressive argument that the 
minimum age for a person to be recruited into or involved in active combat is 
trending toward eighteen years of age.63 This is derived from the normative shifts 
in the practices and statements or declarations of nations coupled with treaties that 
have codified this emergence in international law.64 Discussion shall ensue with the 
concept that the previous international treaty and crystallized customary law that 
the age of majority is fifteen years, has likely begun to shift toward the normative 
age of eighteen as the age of majority for use in armed conflict.65  
Most nations are contracting parties to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC)66 and its Optional Protocol on Children and Armed 
Conflict (Protocol I).67 Protocol I codified the modern prevailing state practice, 
which has arguably altered the normative age from the established age of fifteen to 
an age closer to eighteen.68 The increase in age for persons to be used in combat in 
Protocol I is prima facie evidence of this shift. The evidence is in the form of a 
declaration from the international community that the acceptable normative 
regarding the age of combatants has, at a minimum, begun to shift if it has not 
already shifted.  
This norm has shifted markedly since World War II. The original CRC was a 
large leap forward in codifying the normative that children were not to be used in 
armed conflict until reaching the age of fifteen.69 The Protocol to the CRC was a 
codification of the rapid subsequent shift in the normative age for participation in 
armed conflict. This subsequent and swift shift in international law did, however, 
leave a gap in the protection of children from the age of fifteen to seventeen years 
of age. The Protocol was quickly framed to address the issue via indicating the 
shifting norm and codifying the normative shift in a manner that allowed states to 
 ________________________  
 61. See, e.g., ELLIS WASHINGTON, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: LAST TRAGEDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 73–74 
(University Press of America, Inc. 2008). 
 62. See generally id. 
 63. See generally Ann Davison, Child Soldiers: No Longer a Minor Incident, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. 
& DISP. RESOL. 124 (2004) (Davidson discusses the age of child combatants in militarized countries, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and her own recommendations for more clear regulations of child soldiers).  
 64. See, e.g., id. 
 65. See, e.g., EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 144–48 (Cambridge 
University Press 2008). 
 66. See The Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 21. The Convention set the age which one 
can serve in active conflict, or be recruited to serve, in the military as fifteen years of age. 
 67. See generally Protocol I, supra note 24 (Curious enough, the United States has become a party to this 
treaty while remaining not a party to the parent CRC.). 
 68. See id.  
 69. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 21, at art. 38, § 2. 
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derogate from using persons eighteen and older if it was needed, so long as certain 
criteria were met and not to utilize any child less than fifteen years of age.70 
This codification has received the express support, via signatory to Protocol I, 
of the majority of nations around the world. Specifically, the normative shift that 
states are declaring, and for the majority of states actually practicing, is that 
children ought not to be used in armed conflict.71 The original CRC and United 
Nations declarations establish that children are to be the objects of special interest 
and protections.72 In fact, the Protocol has 152 contracting parties as of January 7, 
2014.73 The Protocol entered into force on February 12, 2002.74 Such widespread 
acceptance, in addition to the nearly decade long history of the Protocol and 
support from the major nations, is indicative of being applicable under customary 
international law, even to those who have not signed the Protocol. This shows a 
new humanitarian and human rights evolution, which nations are now just realizing 
that children ought not to be used in armed conflict, but more importantly, nations 
are pronouncing, declaring, and establishing new international norms through 
treaty and practice that children ought not to be used in armed conflict.  
Nations have a vested interest in protecting the children within their borders. 
The children of today are the future of humanity and the leaders, workers, and 
scholars of their nation’s future. As a result, the international community has 
spoken out to declare eighteen as the accepted age required for one to be utilized in 
military endeavors.75 However, nations have reserved, within Protocol I, the right 
to utilize children should they not be able to recruit enough persons to maintain an 
effective military.76 This is an expected clause to be placed in the Protocol 
especially in the initial shift in normative age of combatants. Protocol I “outlaws” 
the use of child soldiers in participating in active combat and the recruitment of 
children for such purposes.77 The laws regarding armed conflict are decided by 
nations of the global community; not by warlords, tyrants, and opportunists. 
Argumentation based on recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts by 
warlords, tyrants, or any other non-state actors is not relevant with determining 
international law. However, there are over 300,000 children that are used in 
conflicts globally.78 Therefore, the importance of determining where international 
 ________________________  
 70. Protocol I, supra note 24, at Annex I. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See, e.g., CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 22, at 3077; see also 
Protocol I, supra note 24, at Annex I; see also Press Release, Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
supra note 3; see also A World Fit For Children, G.A. Res. S-27/2 (Oct. 11, 2002); see also G.A. Res. 62/141, 
U.N. Doc. A/62/435 (Feb. 22, 2008); see also G.A. Res. 63/241, U.N. Doc. A/63/426 (Mar. 13, 2009). 
 73. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Protocol I, supra note 24, at Annex I. 
 76. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 73. 
 77. MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION 2 (Harvard University Press, 
2006). 
 78. Press Release, Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, supra note 3. 
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law is now, regarding children in armed conflict, and where the law is going is of 
paramount importance.  
One could argue that Protocol I is not binding in that it does not require 
contracting parties to criminalize conduct of state or other actors—it is an optional 
protocol. This view is either flawed or supports the customary law argument that 
the majority of nations have decided that the age of majority with regard to military 
endeavors is eighteen (with reservations mentioned above). The number of nations 
supporting Protocol I backed by the passage of time and state practice has 
contributed to establishing a shift, or at a minimum the initiation of a shift, in the 
normative age of majority regarding soldiers. The age of eighteen has arguably 
become the international normative, accepted by states, as the age of majority in 
active combat and in the recruitment of soldiers.79 
Should a state require recruiting persons under the age of eighteen, then it is 
necessary to define “active combat” and “recruitment” to ensure communication in 
this article is accurate. It must be noted that different societies will have domestic 
norms that differ, perhaps significantly. A fluid interpretation of Protocol I seems 
to be possible under certain auspices, such as:  
[Nations] that permit voluntary recruitment into their national 
armed forces under the age of 18 shall maintain safeguards to 
ensure, as a minimum, that: (a) [s]uch recruitment is genuinely 
voluntary; (b) [s]uch recruitment is done with the informed 
consent of the person’s parents or legal guardians; (c) [s]uch 
persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military 
service; (d) [s]uch persons provide reliable proof of age prior to 
acceptance into national military service.80 
Active combat, as it relates to the CRC and its Protocol I, should be viewed as 
“job oriented” if the nation affirmatively recruits underage soldiers. The modern 
battlefield is no longer linear. Thus, it is not possible to ensure that a soldier 
working in a support role will never see conflict. However, the non-combat arms 
“jobs” have different roles and purposes within the military.81 This is significant in 
light of the intense training one undergoes within the military. It is one thing to 
possibly be near or observe combat; it is another to be trained to be the killer and 
participate in combat—both can be extremely traumatizing. Perhaps an acceptable 
median is a policy that would accept only those that are at least seventeen years of 
age and allow the training time, subsequent to their voluntary enlistment, to elapse 
the remaining time until the individual turns eighteen years of age. The United 
 ________________________  
 79. Compare Protocol I, supra note 24, with African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, art. 2 (1990) (This treaty encompasses the African region and sets the legal age of 
majority similar to that of the Optional Protocol I, as eighteen years of age). 
 80. Protocol I, supra note 24 at art. 3. 
 81. The “combat arms” role in a military is being defined as the portion of the military that is used to attack 
or defend (to simplify), such as: the infantry, artillery, armor, etc. Non-combat arms in contrast is all other portions 
of the military whose job is to perform support functions such as mail clerks, legal assistants, veterinarians, etc. 
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States, for example, allows children over the age of seventeen to enlist in the 
military with the consent of their parents and provides an intensive and relatively 
lengthy training regimen that those children must complete in order to serve in the 
United States military.82 
The term “recruitment” under the CRC and its Protocol I is an ambiguous term. 
“Recruitment” has been defined differently by various nations. One such variation 
permits seventeen-year-olds to enlist in a volunteer army as operating within 
Protocol I.83 On the other hand, this interpretation could be argued as a violation of 
Protocol I; and such a violation may be argued as intentionally misconstruing 
interpretation of Protocol I. Specifically, Protocol I could be read to indicate that 
targeted recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen, without reason or need, 
is prohibited. However, Protocol I bans the use of underage soldiers in active 
combat, but permits derogation.84  
The application banning the recruitment of or use of underage soldiers in active 
combat is superfluous when compared with the complete ban on the active 
recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen. The more efficient interpretation 
of Protocol I interacts in harmony with the spirit of both restrictions regarding the 
active combat and the active recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen. 
Therefore, the intent of Protocol I is met by ensuring that persons under the age of 
eighteen are not actively recruited and are not finished with their initial military 
training until the age of eighteen. 
C.   Children Meet the Criteria Set Forth in Akayesu to Be a Group 
Recognized Under the Law of Genocide 
National, ethnic, racial, and religious groups are the expressed groups that are 
identified in the Genocide Convention.85 Historically, genocide has been 
understood to “not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except 
when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation.”86 The Genocide 
Convention recognized this and codified four specific groups and five elements 
that could trigger the enforcement of the Genocide Convention.87 The members of 
the Convention did leave out certain groups. Restricting recognition to members of 
a nation was in view of the “exclusion of the more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins 
through individual voluntary commitment, such as political and economic 
groups.”88 However, Akayesu showed that there were “qualities” that could be used 
 ________________________  
 82. See 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2014). 
 83. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, supra note 73. 
 84. See Protocol I, supra note 24 at art. 3. 
 85. The Genocide Convention, supra note 20 at art. II.  
 86. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, & SAMANTHA POWER, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: 
LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2d ed. 2008). 
 87. The Genocide Convention, supra note 20 at art. II. 
 88. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 511 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
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to determine if persons constitute a group as intended under the Genocide 
Convention.89 
Akayesu articulated “qualities” such as “not challengeable by its members, who 
belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable 
manner.”90 Akayesu represents jurisprudence that has established the above 
qualities and further established that groups not expressly stated in the Genocide 
Convention may be recognized under the Convention via the qualities that are 
exhibited by a particular group.91 
It is not viable to argue against a child being born into childhood—a class or 
group of which the child will be a member until they reach the age of majority. 
This is an irremediable trait that is exhibited by children and that trait is beyond 
repute. Alternatively, children are the most important subgroup of any larger 
group.92 This is true with regard to any national, ethnic, racial, religious, or any 
other group within humanity. International law has repetitively acknowledged the 
need to protect children.93 The reasoning for this heavy interest in the health, 
welfare, and psychological well-being of children is sound. Children are the heirs 
that will undoubtedly continue the legacy of each nation, ethnicity, race, and 
religion. The destruction of this fragile underpinning of humanity ultimately leads 
to the destruction of the group to which the children are a part.  
The United Nations has identified government armed forces, paramilitary 
groups, and armed opposition groups that are utilizing child soldiers.94 These 
nations frequently have opposition groups attempting to seize the government of 
their respective nations.95 These opposition groups are notorious for using children 
 ________________________  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. See id. 
 92. See generally Protocol I, supra note 24. 
 93. See generally CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 22.  
 94. COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, WORLD MAP OF CHILD SOLDIERS, 2000/2001, 
available at http://www.mickmaurer.com/files/child_soldiers.pdf. This map is an excellent device to show the use 
of child soldiers is an issue that is widespread enough to cause concern. Yet, confined to a small enough of a group 
of countries to show this is not the generally accepted norm. Attention must be placed with the fact that many of 
the nations indicated within this map have children used by opposition groups and not by the national 
governments. However, there are some governments that are utilizing child soldiers. Additionally, the purposes for 
the use of children in these nations vary greatly and require more inquiry than this paper provides in order to 
comprehend the intricacies involved from historical exploitation, international “willful blindness,” to simple 
indifference based upon decades or centuries of ethnic or racial ideologies of supremacy. 
 
List of Countries with Child Soldiers Fighting in Recent and Ongoing Conflicts (G: 
government armed forces, P: paramilitaries, O: armed opposition groups) Colombia (P,O); 
Mexico (P,O); Peru (O); Russian Federation (O); Turkey (O); Yugoslavia (former Rep. of) 
(P,O); Algeria (P,O); Angola (G,O); Burundi (G,O); Chad (G); Republic of Congo (G,O); 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo (G,O); Eritrea (G); Ethiopia (G); Rwanda (G,O); Sierra Leone 
(G,P,O); Somalia (all groups); Sudan (G,P,O); Uganda (G,O); Iran (G,O); Iraq (G,O); Israel 
and Occupied Territories (G,O); Lebanon (O); Afghanistan (all groups); India (P,O); 
Indonesia (P,O); Myanmar (G,O); Nepal (O); Pakistan (O); Philippines (O); Solomon 
Islands (O); Sri Lanka (O); East Timor (P,O);Tajikistan (O); Papua New Guinea (O); 
Uzbekistan (O). 
Id. 
 95. Id. 
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in order to further their own interests.96 Such destruction of youth is not acceptable 
for one to commit or the international community to rhetorically scold. With an 
understanding of the history and modern legal framework of genocide, a 
determination of the legal age of a child, and that children can and must be 
considered a group within the meaning of genocide, it is now proper to begin an 
analysis of the elements of genocide as applied to child soldiering. 
PART II 
QUALIFICATION OF GENOCIDE, BY THE USE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED 
CONFLICT, IS SHOWN THROUGH THE INTENT TO DESTROY IN WHOLE OR IN 
PART ANY GROUP THROUGH ANY ONE OF THE FIVE DISJUNCTIVE ELEMENTS 
OF GENOCIDE 
There is a need to determine whether there is an argument under any of the five 
disjunctive elements for genocide regarding the use of child soldiers. Each element 
shall include a general rule guided by jurisprudential judgments that interpreted the 
Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute. Specifically, Akayesu will be the 
primary jurisprudence from which the general rules are derived in this paper. 
Under each element, the general rule will be followed by an analysis of whether 
there is a substantive argument for genocide under each individual element. First, 
this section provides an analysis as to what is genocidal intent to “destroy, in whole 
or in part . . . members of the group.”97 
A.   Genocidal Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part Members of the 
Group 
Genocidal intent is “culpable” when one has committed an offense that is 
covered by Article 2(a)–(e) of the Genocide Convention, or an equivalent statute 
enacted in furtherance of the Genocide Convention, “with the clear intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group.”98 Culpability is established 
because the offender “knew or should have known” his or her act would “destroy, 
in whole or in part, a group.”99 For an act to be charged under the Genocide 
Convention, or equivalent statute, the act must be against “one or several 
individuals,” because the individual belongs to a group, and is targeted primarily 
because of his or her membership to the group.100 This dolus specialis, or special 
intent, is the key to explaining or defining genocidal intent.101  
The limitation in the targeting of the group establishes the intent to “destroy, in 
whole or in part, the group.”102 Specific intent can be established through 
 ________________________  
 96. Id. 
 97. The Genocide Convention, supra note 20 at art. II. 
 98. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 520 (Sept. 2, 1998) (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. (emphasis added). 
 100. See id. at ¶ 521. 
 101. Id. at ¶ 517. 
 102. Id. at ¶ 522. 
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“inferring” facts from the offense as they occur in context with other factors.103 The 
other factors can be “the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, . . . [or] 
deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of 
a particular group.”104 Additionally, the “exclusion” of other groups can “infer” 
genocidal intent.105 
Drafters of the Genocide Convention had the intent to deter acts of genocide 
against any stable and permanent group.106 This interpretation of the Convention 
was set forth in Akayesu.107 Akayesu determined that “it is particularly important to 
respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, which according 
to the travaux préparatoires, was patently to ensure the protection of any stable 
and permanent group.”108 Children are clearly a stable and permanent group. 
Membership of this group is from birth until one reaches the age of majority. The 
permanence of the group (i.e., children) will exist until the end of humanity itself. 
Therefore, the “stable” and “permanent” criteria, as set forth in Akayesu, is met. 
Children have been recognized repeatedly as a group to whom the world, or 
“mankind,” owes a debt of recognition and special protection.109 When children are 
sought out for recruitment purposes, to be used in armed conflict, those that seek 
the children often show little intent other than simply choosing children because 
they are children.110 One may view the perfect soldier as one that follows orders 
without question. Children can and often are beaten and trained into these very 
types of soldiers.111 Thus, children are targeted specifically for their mental 
“pliability.”112 On the other hand, one could argue that children may be willing to 
participate in armed conflict and are even treated as well as their adult counterparts. 
Perhaps even given a monetary or property interest as compensation paid to either 
the children or their families.113 This argument has a facial appeal to it, which 
initially sounds reasonable. This reasonableness is quickly diminished when one 
looks into the ability of a child to make sound decisions for him or herself. The 
child’s family should not be given total authority to send their child to an armed 
conflict so that they may reap a benefit. On the one hand, this may be viewed as the 
child supporting his or her family. However, it is also a dominant position, which 
reaps all the benefits of an agreement and the child is left to suffer all detriment, 
mental and physical, that he or she receives from participating in armed conflict. 
Children cannot generally make a rational and informed decision to serve in armed 
 ________________________  
 103. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 517. 
 104. Id. at ¶ 523 (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at ¶ 517. 
 107. See generally id. 
 108. Id. at ¶ 516. 
 109. See generally A World Fit for Children, G.A. Res. S-27/2f World Fit Fldren, rg Legacyay. om 
itted ing the accidents for either of them.howed that the it was what he thought then it was, supra note 72; see also 
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 62/141 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 110. WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 35. 
 111. f World Fit Fldren, rg Legacyay. om 
itted ing the accidents for either of them.howed that the it was what he thought then it wasId. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 55. 
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conflict and their families should not be permitted to make such a decision in their 
stead without completely informing the child and gaining his or her complete and 
genuine assent. Children have a reduced ability to understand the circumstances, 
specifically, those involved in decisions regarding armed conflict.114 Therefore, 
formal recognition of children as a group protected by the Genocide Convention is 
an issue that is ripe within the international community. The judgment of Akayesu 
has provided the jurisprudence needed to bolster the international effort to protect 
children from being used in armed conflict. 
B.   Killing Members of the Group 
“Killing” is a term that should be addressed due to its ambiguity. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has produced jurisprudence to interpret 
the ambiguity of the term “killing.”115 There is a difference in the English and 
French translations in the Genocide Convention.116 The difference of the two 
translations is that the French version has additional inferences attached that add an 
element of intent.117 The French version includes the word meurtre which indicates 
a killing.118 More specifically, meutre indicates an intentional killing,119 whereas 
the English word “killing” could refer to a death, which was unintentional. The 
“precision” of the French version is “preferred.”120 
Children are killed intentionally throughout the world during armed conflict. 
One such method is to target children to terrorize towns or villages. The National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola has used the strategy of murdering 
infants in order to terrorize locals in villages.121 Many more children are killed 
through ordinance, nutritional deprivation, issues surrounding displacement due to 
armed conflict, as well as poverty brought about due to killing the children’s 
families.122 
Child soldiers are prone to have their lives unnecessarily thrown away because 
children are “exploitable” and “expendable.”123 In West Africa, the “shock value” 
of young boys has been utilized by sending them into combat naked to terrorize the 
opponent.124 The “shock value” of child soldiers in West Africa cannot be 
summarized by only this one method of exploitation, they are also sent to 
“spearhead” assault operations.125 Children are specifically chosen to go on suicide 
missions because they do not have a “sense of morality” that has developed to a 
point commensurate with that which is necessary to make sound decisions in 
 ________________________  
 114. See id. at 36. 
 115. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 500 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 24. 
 122. Id. at 24–25. 
 123. Id. at 34. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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combat.126 This is evidenced through sending child soldiers through minefields to 
clear the minefield for the adult soldiers.127 Terroristic use of children is another 
form of exploitation of children in armed conflict.  
In Afghanistan, multiple groups are recruiting children to carry out terrorist 
activities. 128 Groups that recruit children for terroristic activities include the 
“Taliban, the Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islami, the Tora Bora Front, and Jamat 
Sunat al-Dawa Salafia,” and these groups utilize “children as young as 13 and 14 
years of age” by using children in “plant[ing] explosives” or by blowing 
themselves up in “suicide attacks.”129 
In Iraq, Al-Qaeda seems to be the primary group in recruiting children to 
perform terrorist actions.130 Children have been “tricked, coerced[,] or enticed with 
financial incentives” to perform “acts of terror” or, more specifically, to be “suicide 
bombers.”131 Children in Iraq have been recruited to perform “acts of terror” as 
young as “14 to 16 years of age.”132 
Children are exploited as child soldiers. Children are chosen for their 
developmental immaturity to perform tasks that they are not expected to live 
through so that the more seasoned, older troops, that have been trained extensively 
or have substantial training may be preserved.133 On the other hand, it must be 
noted that the child soldiers have a greater level of security than those they rape, 
rob, and pillage.134 Additionally, child soldiers may have a better diet than other 
children in the area because they forcibly take food from others.135 In practice, it 
may be extraordinarily difficult to parse the use of soldiers for the purpose of 
conducting hostilities and using them for the purpose of exterminating the children 
because they are children. However, one cannot make a sound argument that by 
creating a larger evil, one is justified by exploiting a child through means that are a 
lesser evil. It is clear that children are being intentionally killed in order to further 
the interests of the groups that exploit them. Additionally, it is also damning that 
children are specifically targeted for use in armed conflict due to the characteristics 
of children as a group such as being young, pliable, and able to be indoctrinated 
easily. 
C.   Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the Group 
Serious bodily or mental harm does not require the harm to be “permanent” or 
“irremediable.”136 However, the harm does need to be “more than minor or 
 ________________________  
 126. Id. at 36. 
 127. WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 37. 
 128. Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 47, G.A. Res. 64/742 (Apr. 13, 
2010) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report on Children 2010]. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at ¶ 81. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 37. 
 134. Id. at 23. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 502 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
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temporary impairment.”137 This threshold element need not be limited to bodily or 
mental “acts of torture.”138 Nor should this element be limited to “inhumane or 
degrading treatment” or “persecution” of a group.139 Akayesu specifically noted 
that the mental harm inflicted upon rape victims qualifies as being protected under 
genocide statutes.140  
Serious bodily harm is presented in multiple ways. Battlefield casualties are 
inherent to armed conflict and must be strategically considered by every 
commander or leader in preparation of an attack. Military recruitment coerced by 
physical and/or sexual violence can result in both bodily and mental harm. Superior 
ranking military members may sexually abuse child subordinates.141 In addition, 
children are forced or coerced into taking drugs to alter their state of mind.142 
The mental trauma inflicted upon underage soldiers is massive. Children are 
vulnerable to manipulation and unaware of the long-term psychological damage 
being inflicted upon them. Notably, adults experience psychological trauma from 
armed conflict.143 Certainly, adults are better equipped to psychologically deal with 
the intense stress and gore present on the battlefield.144 In addition, adults have the 
maturity to comprehend the magnitude of the decisions that are necessary for one 
to make when in combat that affect their very ability to live through the 
engagement. In contrast, children simply cannot appreciate the danger that is 
presented to them in circumstances of armed conflict where the lack of maturity 
devalues the significance of life itself.145 
Mental damage resulting from armed conflict is manifested in various ways for 
different cultures. Posttraumatic stress disorder is one possible result of the 
“extreme traumatic stressor[s]” inflicted upon those used in armed conflict.146 
 ________________________  
 137. STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS, & JAMES L. BISCHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBURG LEGACY 31 (Oxford University Press 2009), 
(Citing Semanza Trial Judgment, ¶ 320–22; Blagojevic and Jokic Trial Judgment, ¶ 645.). 
 138. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 504. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at ¶ 508. “For instance, rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped 
refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, 
not to procreate.” Id. 
 141. See, e.g., WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 97. 
 142. Id. at 76–77. 
 143. Id. at 129. 
 144. Id. at 74 (stating that adults have more control over their emotions than children do, especially in 
combat-type situations). 
 145. See id. at 35–36.  
 146. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
463–65 (American Psychiatric Ass’n, 4th ed., text rev., 2000). The following passage is illustrative to show only 
one of many possible forms of psychological damage, and the diagnostic measurements are substantially linked to 
this topic:  
Posttraumatic stress disorder . . . follow[s] exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor 
involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or 
serious injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that 
involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning 
about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by 
a family member or other close associate [such as fellow soldiers] (Criterion A1). . . . The 
characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure to the extreme trauma include 
persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event (Criterion B), persistent avoidance of 
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African conflicts have caused more mental trauma to children than in other regions 
of the world. 
Girl soldiers, and girls generally, have a “visibly” higher rate of sexual 
exploitation than their male counter parts.147 Underage girls are routinely sought, or 
hunted, to fill the ranks of militaries which use child soldiers.148 Girl soldiers 
perform a variety of matriarchal tasks that are additional to their military focus.149 
Young females are brutalized until total obedience is achieved, then continually 
beaten to ensure continued obedience.150 The psychological impact of the physical 
and mental brutality inflicted through sexual exploitation of young females is far 
reaching.  
There is an undeniable link from the use of children in armed conflict to their 
bodily and mental harm. The children who survive the ordeal of armed conflict 
may be physically intact, or perhaps not. However, child soldiers are likely to have 
suffered mental harm that will substantially damage them psychologically in a 
manner that may be temporary or permanent. Furthermore, the damage inflicted 
upon these children, due to their mental immaturity, would be analogous to victims 
of torture and inhumane treatment. The use of children as a whole, or even as a 
subgroup of another, in armed conflict and the resulting damage that occurs to the 
children clearly shows that their use in armed conflict is substantial and temporally 
sufficient to justify a charge of genocide against those who recruit or use them in 
armed conflict. 
D.   Deliberately Inflicting upon the Group Conditions of Life Calculated 
to Bring About its Physical Destruction in Whole or in Part 
This element requires an act which is “calculated” to “ultimately” bring about 
the “physical destruction” of a group through “inflicting on the group conditions . . 
. to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”151 The conditions are 
not required to “immediately” destroy the group or to kill persons within the 
  
stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (Criterion C), and 
persistent symptoms of increased arousal (Criterion D). . . . Traumatic events that are 
experienced directly include, but are not limited to, military combat, violent personal assault 
(sexual assault, physical attack, robbery, mugging), being kidnapped, being taken hostage, 
terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war[.] . . . Witnessed events include . . 
. observing the serious injury or unnatural death of another person due to violent assault, 
accident, war, or disaster or unexpectedly witnessing a dead body or body parts. Associated 
descriptive features . . . [include] impaired affect modulation; self-destructive and impulsive 
behavior; dissociative symptoms; somatic complaints; . . . shame, despair, or hopelessness; 
feeling permanently damaged; a loss of previously sustained beliefs; hostility; social 
withdrawal; feeling constantly threatened; impaired relationships with others; or a change 
from the individual’s previous personality characteristics. 
Id. 
 147. See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 85–106. 
 148. See id. at 86. 
 149. Id. at 86. Matriarchal duties in this context are such that the female performs because it is her ‘duty’ in 
the setting. These duties would entail cooking and cleaning, among other duties, for the other male soldiers. Id. 
 150. Id. at 88–89, 93–95. 
 151. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 505 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
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group.152 “[S]ubjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic 
expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services below 
minimum requirement” are ways in which conditions of life can be controlled to 
bring about the physical destruction of a group.153 
There is an argument that the conditions placed upon child soldiers are 
commensurate to being calculated to bring about their destruction in whole or in 
part. The children endure hardships from the moment of contact with many armed 
groups.154 Child soldiers are forced to perform grueling marches;155 if not 
completed, the child is subject to extreme discipline or viciously killed.156 Often 
these killings are by fellow child soldiers, who are forced to kill the child that 
cannot continue on.157 Heavy labor and famine are especially hard on child 
soldiers, as they dare not show weakness or defiance.158 Drugs are given to, and 
sometimes forced upon, child soldiers.159 Children are given these pills to be 
“fearless.”160 In essence, the children are shaped to be totally physically, 
psychologically, and chemically dependent upon the armed group to which they are 
a part. Severity of the above-mentioned conditions should be weighed to determine 
whether the conditions of life have been inflicted to bring about the destruction of 
the children. A combination of the above harms may, or just a significant harm that 
is severe enough could, destroy in part children as a group or as the subgroup of 
another nation, ethnicity, race, or religion. 
E.   Imposing Measures Intended to Prevent Births from Within the 
Group 
Measures that are “intended to prevent births within the group” will subject a 
perpetrator to genocide statutes.161 Examples of “intending” to “prevent births” are 
“sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of 
the sexes and prohibition of marriages.”162  
In Afghanistan, young boy soldiers are “at great risk of sexual exploitation.”163 
Boys make up the “overwhelming majority” of fourteen to eighteen year old 
children exploited by armed groups in Afghanistan.164 It is recognized that sexual 
violence in Afghanistan is a “widespread phenomenon.”165 The practice of bacha 
 ________________________  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at ¶ 506. 
 154. See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 57. 
 155. Id. at 61, 92. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 92. 
 158. Id. at 57–84. 
 159. Id. at 76. 
 160. See, e.g., WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 76–77.  
 161. See Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 507 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 162. Id. 
 163. WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 97. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra note 128, at ¶ 49. 
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bazi, sexual slavery of a young male, is prevalent enough to become a “matter of 
concern” for the international community.166 
Charging those who rape child soldiers with the crime of genocide is 
supportable by Akayesu.167 The induction of a female soldier into armed groups is 
particularly one that has a propensity of sexual violence.168 The mental harm 
experienced by a raped child soldier can result in extensive psychological problems 
to a child. For instance, if the sexual abuse is so severe that the children do not 
wish to have future sexual relations, then that underscores a reasonable argument 
that genocide has been committed.169 There may be difficulty in getting children, or 
those that eventually reach adulthood, to admit that the sexual violence committed 
against them occurred,170 much less, have them explain the rationale behind why 
they do not want to have sexual relations in the present. These are complex issues. 
Not only is there sexual violence and shame associated with it, but there are other 
factors in play as well, such as the stigma of being a “child soldier.” Such stigma 
can ostracize someone who is a former underage soldier.  
Both civilian children and children that are recruited and used in armed conflict 
have a vulnerability to being raped.171 However, the added stress and pressure from 
those in authoritative positions in armed groups present an additional set of factors 
that are not present in civilian children that are raped.  
In the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), young girls are 
not as prone to physical sexual violence.172 Instead, commanders use money and 
power to influence young girls into becoming their “wife” and substitute physical 
dominance with coercion through influence as a method of exploitation.173 In the 
end, children are subject to psychologically damaging sexual abuse by force or 
coercion by armed groups.174 Civilians in areas near armed groups are at risk of 
being raped by members of those groups. Child soldiers of armed groups that do 
not ban sexual violence are also constantly in danger of rape, abuse, and 
humiliation.175 The impact of this exploitation can cause reluctance or refusal to 
procreate willingly once the children reach adulthood and acclimate back into the 
civilian world.176 
The repeated raping of the female soldier may be arguable as designed to 
prevent births due to many reasons, one of which could be physical damage 
because the raping of female soldiers is often done to keep her in her “place.”177 
 ________________________  
 166. Id. 
 167. See generally Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. 
 168. See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 89. 
 169. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 508. 
 170. See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 85. 
 171. See generally Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra note 128; see also WESSELLS, supra 
note 77. 
 172. WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 95–96. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra note 128, at ¶ 20; WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 
86–87. 
 176. See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 94. 
 177. Id. 
21
: Children, Armed Conflict, and Genocide
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2014
356 Barry Law Review Vol. 19, No. 2 
 
Whereas an extended reliance of a young male subject to bacha bazi would 
arguably diminish his ability to perform customary roles required for passing along 
the traditional rituals for the continuance of their religious or cultural 
background.178 
Child soldiers are being targeted due to their membership in the group of 
children because they are pliable, physically incapable of resisting, and because 
they will be shamed into staying with the armed group out of shame resulting from 
being raped.179 Once children are brought into the fold it is easy to see how they 
could lose hope under the circumstances placed in front of them.  
F.   Forcibly Transferring Children of the Group to Another Group 
One forcibly transfers children of a group to another when there is a “direct 
act,” “threat” to act, or “trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of 
children from one group to another.”180 There is a strong argument for the charge 
of genocide in forcible transfer, particularly with children as a group being targeted 
for their vulnerability to be hunted and forced from their natural or community 
group to the armed group that takes them.  
Somalia, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Uganda, and many 
other countries have armed groups such as: “Al-Shabaab” in Somolia; the “armee 
nationale tchadienne[,]” known as ANT in Chad; “Forces armées de la Republique 
democratique du Congo[,]” known as the FARDC, “Mai-Mai factions,” the 
“Patriotes resistants congolais[,]”… the Forces democratiques de liberation du 
Rwanda[,]” also known as the FDLR, and the “Congrès national pour la défense du 
peuple[,]” known as the CNDP all in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the 
“Sudan People’s Liberation Army[,]” known as the SPLA in the Sudan; and the 
“Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda.”181 These groups use a variety of 
tactics to recruit children. Some of the common evasive tactics are to forcibly enter 
homes, extract children, and forcibly take the children to assimilate into their 
armed groups.182 To take a child from its family, tribe, ethnic, national, or religious 
group and to attempt to force the child to adapt or be brutalized into the armed 
group is a prima facie argument for the forcible transfer of children from one group 
to another. Once children are assimilated into an armed group and subjected to 
armed conflict and sexual violence or exploitation, they are likely to have 
substantial issues acclimating back into their original group, if they ever get the 
opportunity to return.183 The children’s core values, their outlook on life, and 
respect for individuals are changed from experiencing a life where a child must 
make “deci[sions] for life and death.”184 
 ________________________  
 178. See Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra at note 128, at ¶ 21. 
 179. WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 34–37. 
 180. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 509 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 181. See generally Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra note 86; see also WESSELLS, supra 
note 77.  
 182. See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 37–38. 
 183. See id. at 154–61. 
 184. Id. at 174. 
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Cultural genocide is a concept that deserves attention. This concept was 
specifically left out of the Genocide Convention.185 However, the forcible transfer 
of children provision, an alternative to the cultural genocide theory, was included 
in the Genocide Convention at the Sixth Committee.186 William Schabas put forth a 
strong theoretical argument for the forcible transfer of children to another group as 
being cultural genocide. 
The mental element of . . . [forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group] does not appear to pose any particular 
difficulties. The offender must have the specific intent to transfer 
forcibly children of the group to another group. The offender must 
have knowledge of the fact that children belong to one group, and 
that they are being transferred to another group. Thus, an 
individual who perpetrated the transfer of children from a victim 
group would have to know that the children were in fact members 
of the group. Similarly, he or she would have to know that what 
the children were being transferred to was in fact another group. 
[This provision] . . . is somewhat anomalous, because it 
contemplates what is in reality a form of cultural genocide, despite 
the clear decision of the drafters to exclude cultural genocide from 
the scope of the Convention. As a result, in prosecution of the 
perpetrator of the crime defined by … [the provision], the 
prosecution would be required to prove the intent “to destroy” the 
group in a cultural sense rather than in a physical or biological 
sense.187 
Both Akayesu and Schabas provide direction and insight into the context of 
removing children from their group and implementing them into armed groups. 
Akayesu provides a jurisprudential definition for this provision of genocide.188 
Schabas provides an excellent parallel of reasoning behind the provision.189  
Schabas’s work applied to actions of certain armed groups, such as the LRA, 
where children are abducted from their families and villages, is a supportive 
argument when discussing intent.190 The argument of one abducting a child from a 
home or village and subsequently indoctrinating that child into a militaristic culture 
is a small inferential argument.  
 ________________________  
 185. See The Genocide Convention, supra note 20. 
 186. See MACHTELD BOOT, GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES: NULLUM CRIMEN 
SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 450 (Intersentia 
Uitgevers N.V. 2002). Boot includes extensive research pertaining to genocide and is more compendious than this 
paper need be. 
 187. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 
2009). 
 188. See id. at 202. 
 189. See id. at 294. 
 190. WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 39. 
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The meaning of “forcibly” is also a matter in need of discussion. It is not 
specifically required that the transfer of children need occur as a result of brute 
force or coercion.191 An entity that governs or has de facto control over an area may 
result in a genocidal act by directing children to transfer groups.192 The children or 
their organic group (family, tribe, or community) may “obediently perform” such a 
direction by the governing body and this could still be an act of genocide.193 
“Forcing” children to adopt the dominant language, or another culture (such as a 
militaristic culture), can result in a form of “linguistic and/or cultural genocide,” 
also referred to as “ethnocide.”194 
The dangers resulting from moving children out of their organic group have, as 
shown above, been recognized widely. Children that are “forced” into child 
soldiering may not only lose important opportunities to learn and pass on their 
culture during the absence from their organic group, but also may be secluded or 
stigmatized after they are no longer a soldier and decide to try to acclimate back to 
civilian life.195 Some children are required to commit egregious acts of violence 
during their initial induction into an armed group.196 In order to “cut child recruits 
off from their former lives,” they were “hardened” by being forced, by the 
Revolutionary United Front, known as the RUF in Sierra Leone, to kill family 
members or neighbors.197 This creates a perpetual cycle that assists, specifically in 
Africa, a continued cultural deterioration. Child soldiering and the cultural fallout 
of “forced” transfer stands out, specifically, in Africa due to the multitude of issues 
surrounding post-colonial Africa. Africa has been on the leading edge in 
recognizing children’s rights, particularly as they pertain to armed conflict.198  
In summary, many governments and de facto governing, or power sharing, 
military groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army in the Sudan “forcibly” transfer children into their armed groups for 
purposes of providing additional manpower for use in armed conflict.199 This 
transfer is tantamount to destroying not only children as a whole, but also the 
national, ethnic, racial, or religious (and cultural) group they are also a part of. For 
these reasons, the “forcible” transfer of children by armed groups, for the purpose 
of using those children in armed conflict, constitutes genocide due to the inherent 
rupture in the children’s cultural, linguistic, religious, legal, and familial traditions.  
 ________________________  
 191. BOOT, supra note 186, at 450. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. U.N. Economic and Social Council, ¶ 5, GA/E/C.19/2008/7 (Feb. 8 2008). 
 195. See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 160. 
 196. See id. at 59. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See JEREMY I. LEVITT ET AL., AFRICA: MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 155–56 
(Jeremy I. Levitt ed., Hart Publishing 2008). Chapter five is particularly on point with Africa’s advancement of 
children’s rights in the midst of armed conflict.  
 199. See generally WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 33–34. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Genocide Convention has been interpreted by International Criminal 
Tribunals.200 Particularly, Akayesu provides the most analogous circumstance for 
application to define children as a group.201 The above discussion shows a 
substantial argument for children to be defined as people that have not attained 
eighteen years of age. This paper recognizes the difficulties in establishing an age 
acceptable to all cultures. Nonetheless, the CRC Protocol I is a viable international 
“thermometer” on the issue of age.  
Children exhibit the qualities defined in Akayesu for identification as a group. 
This paper shows that a substantial argument can be made for each element of 
genocide. Using interpretations of the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute, 
each element and the requirement of genocidal intent were examined independently 
via instances occurring around the world.  
Genocidal intent may possibly occur when children are targeted specifically 
because of their age and relative mental immaturity when it comes to 
understanding the consequences of armed conflict. Further, the relative ease of 
indoctrinating a child through violence or other coercive means implicates that 
those who would seek to do so had the intent, knowledge, or should have had the 
knowledge that so doing would incur, for these children, a fate enumerated in one 
of the genocide elements. The elements of genocide, as shown above, have 
numerous and substantial arguments in the context of children being the target of 
genocide via direct use and recruitment to directly participate in armed conflict. 
Killing members of the group was shown by establishing the recklessness of the 
lives of children once recruited or through sending children to their deaths because 
they would obey without question. Causing serious bodily or mental harm was 
shown mainly through the indoctrination process. Continued violence was a part of 
the need to establish dominance and thus a continuing physical and/or mental 
harm. Deliberately inflicting upon the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its destruction in whole or in part was shown through the grotesque 
conditions children are subjected to when brought into armed groups such as 
grueling forced marches and hard labor. Imposing measures intended to prevent 
births from within the group was shown through the extreme sexual violence 
inflicted upon both young males and females at the will of the commander or 
members of armed groups in order to provide obedience to the subjects of the 
sexual violence and morale, pleasure, and feelings of superiority to those inflicting 
the sexual violence. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group is 
shown most distinctly through children being forcibly abducted from their homes 
from rebel groups such as the LRA. 
In summation, children should be afforded the maximum protections available 
under international law. Children can be established as a group via the criteria set 
forth in Akayesu. Persons less than eighteen years of age is the definition of a child 
 ________________________  
 200. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 201. Id. at ¶ 511. 
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under the CRC Protocol I and international support is rising toward this 
definition.202 Genocidal intent can be established through the types of activities 
children are directed to perform and the manner in which children are obtained.  
All five elements of the Genocide Convention are occurring in varied degrees 
through atrocities around the globe.203 Admittedly, the charge of genocide is not the 
answer to every situation involving children and armed conflict. However, the 
international community owes children every protection that can apply to the 
severity of their situations. Scholarly writings, judicial opinions, and other forms of 
primary and secondary soft law are the appropriate methods of assistance to help 
children in these unique and precarious situations (although, perhaps not in that 
specific order) short of direct humanitarian intervention. This is the proper time to 
formally recognize this group and afford the support for future deterrence, 
diplomatic negotiation, and guidance for criminal proceedings. The laws regarding 
the composition of a group within the meaning of genocide have been shown to 
directly parallel traits exhibited by children. As such, a group under the definition 
of genocide should include children. 
 
 ________________________  
 202. Protocol I, supra note 24, at 3. 
 203. The Genocide Convention, supra note 20. 
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